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BRIEF
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the Honorable Leonard W. Fl-,·

JAY V. BARNEY
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In The S11preme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff-Respondent
vs.
PETE CASTILLO,

Case No.
11447

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
On April 12, 1968, the appellant was charged with the
crime of assault with a deadly weapon in connection with the
stabbing of his former wife, Caroline Castillo, on March 12,
1968. The appellant was bound over and tried in the Third
District Court for the crime accused.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After '.\ trial by jury which began on August 9, 1968, and
concluded on August 12, 1968, the appellant was found guilty
of assault with a deadly weapon. Motion was made for a
trial and was denied. This is an appeal from the conviction and
denied motion.

new

•

:.

RELIH:;-, SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The re$pondent seeks affirmation of the appellant's conviction and of the lower court's denial of his motion for new
trial.
Throughout this brief, references as to the Record will be
designated R. Those pertaining to the Transcript will be designated TI or TU for the two volumes respectively.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent is in general agreement with the statement
of facts as contained in the appellant's brief with the following important exceptions, additions and alterations:
I. Nc·t only did Santana Gonzales not want his sister to
talk to the appellant, but Mrs. Castillo herself had expressed
the same desire (TU",8,30).

2. Appellant fails to mention in his statement of the facts
that Santana Gonzales confirmed the testimony of Mrs. Castillo as to how appellant first attacked Gonzales with a knife and
as to how she was stabbed (Tl.30-32).
3. Officer Clark's testimony as to the physical condition
of the appellant after the incident (TI.60) can be used just as
easily to corroborate the testimony of Santana Gonzales (Tl.3023).
4. While appellant contends in his facts that there was
"substantial testimony" of "mutual hostility", the record reflects that the testimony was far from substantial (TI.17,34),
and that the hostility was more unilateral than mutual (Tl.3 5) ·

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO HIS THEORY
OF THE CASE.
A. Instructions must pertain to and be based upon evidence presented.
The time honored standard for determining the propriety
of instructions given is whether the instructions given adequately relate to the evidence presented. In the case of People v.
Cummings, 141 C.A.2d 193, 296 P.2d 610 (1956) which involved an attempt to commit an abortion, the California court
expressed this fundamental doctrine:
"While it is well settled that a defendant is entitled to instructions based on the theory of his defense, the court may refuse proffered instructions on
a theory that i5 not supported by substantial evidence."
While there is a judicial split as to the amount of evidence
needed to warrant an instruction, some courts saying any evidence, others calling for substantial evidence, the trend seems
to require substantial evidence.

In State v. Mosley, 75 N.M. 348, 404 P.2d 304 ( 1965)
the New Mexico Supreme Court echoed the California decision
in the Cummings case. supra, in holding:
" ... it is well established that the court is not
required to charge the jury on the defendant's theory
of the case unless it is supported bv substantial evidence."
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This same court m State u. Romero, 73 N.M. 109, 385
P.2d 967 ( 1963) earlier said that the refusal of requested instructions on the doctrine of self-defense is proper where the
evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the
crime charged was committed in self-defense.
Can it be said, regarding the instant case, that the evidence presented was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as w
whether the crime charged ·was committed in self-defense? Perhaps the Romaro case provides the clue as to what the courts
mean by "substantial evidence."
This ''substantial evidence" test appears to be the standard
used by Ut2ch courts also. In the case of Stat<' 1·s. fohnson, 112
Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947) which involved the defensr
of self-defense in a conviction for involuntary manslaughter,
this Court said:
"It is admitted that the defendant is entitled to
have the jury instructed on his theory of the case if
there is any substantial evidence to justify giving such
an instruction. However, when the legislature permits
a defendant to avoid the consequences of his act because the killing was excusable, an instruction is not
necessary unless the facts and circumstances impelling
the accused to act are in some way consistent with the
legislative intent to excuse."

In the earlier case of State vs. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144
P.2d 290 ( 1943) this Court seems to have added an additionally required ingredient, that of competence. In that case, the
Court said that each party is entitled to hwe his theorv of the
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case, if supported by competent evidence, submitted to the jury
by appropriate instructions.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the test of substantiality and competence of evidence must be met before proffered instructions can be appropriately presented to the jury.
B. No substantial or competent evidence was presented
as to appelbnt'-; theory of the case, i.e., self-defense.
There was no evidence presented on behalf of the appellant
as to how he supposes his former wife was stabbed.
By his own testimony, the appellant concedes his inability
to relate what he claims must have happened. He states, "After
that, I don'.- rcmemher much if I struggled with the knife or
how I took the knife away from him, or stabbing my wife or
stabbing him" (Til.14).
He was then asked, "And after you saw him coming at
you with a knife, what do you rememer next?" (Til.15).
He answered, "Well, the next thing I remember was that
I was on top of him and he was asking me not to hurt him any
more" (Til.15).
Appellant would have us believe that because he cannot
remember how his former wife was stabbed, it must have been
accidential during an act of self-defense.

It can hardly he contended that such a theory is substantial by either substantial or competent evidence.
The appellant foils to recall any intervention on the part
of his wife. Thus, while by his own testimony he attempts to
bridge the gap of self-defense against Santana Gonzales, the
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second and most expansive gap, that of the accidential stabbing
of his former wife, alludes him completely and remains unexplained.
While there is evidence, the competence of which is highly questionable, that the appellant was defending himself against
an attack by the victim's brother, there is no evidence whatsoever that the victim herself was stabbed during such a defense.
And while it is conceivable that a third person might be accidentally cut during such an alleges affray, it is difficult to
imagine an accidental stabbing as serious as that inflicted upon
Mrs. Castillo.
As has been said, the evidence must be competent to merit
any related instruction. The competence of the appellant's own
testimony must be weighed in light of the predicament in which
he finds himself. Certainly that portion of the appellant's testimony which portrayed the instrument of the stabbing being
mysteriously transferred from his own pocket to his alleged
attacker's hand and then just as mysteriously back to his own,
contributed little to the competence of his testimony (TII.21,
22).
The competence of the appellant's testimony also wears a
little thin in his attempt to explain who ended up with the
knife (Compare TII.15 with TII.22).
It is conceded that while the jury is normally the weigher
of fact, certainly the judge as the giver of the law must initially weigh the evidence presented to determine which law by
way of instruction need be given the jury. In essence, it would
appear that the specificity with which instructions are to be
given the jury depends on the degree to which the evidence
presented warrants mch instructions.

C. Appellant's proposed instruct10ns were faulty in their
statement o{ the law.

With reference to the proposed instructions at R.34 and
R.3 5, it cannot go without note that the retreat doctrine as
limited there only applies if the appellant at the time of the
alleged self-defense is in a place where he has a lawful right to
be. The transcript indicates he barged into a private dwelling
against the expressed desires of the inhabitants (TI.15) . See
People v. Zuckerman, 56 C.A.2d 366, 132 P.2d 545 (1942) and
People v. McDonnel, 94 C.A.2d 885, 211 P.2d 910 (1949).
In this same regard, the law is resplendent with cases which hold
that the claimant of self-defense must be free from fault in
bringing on the difficulty.
With respect to the proposed instruction at R.36, while
this instruction may be partially correct, such anticipation must
be reasonable. There is nothing in the record to show that prior
to the visit by the appellant to the victim's home that her
brother had propensities for violence. On the contrary, there
is evidence that Santana Gonzales made every effort to avoid
such violence (Tl.3 5).
This instruction was also faulty in that it should have stated that arms used in the advanced arming of oneself may not
be of a type, the natural use of which would have exceeded the
force necessary to repel or defend against the anticipated attack.
Proposed Instruction at R.37, The instruction as proposed
only requires the defendant to come forward with "some" evidence to avail himself of the defense. The cases cited thus. far in
this brief indicate that "substantial and competent" evidence
is required.
While that portion of the closing sentence of the instruction which states that if a reasonable doubt exists as to whether

defendant did not act m self-defense, he should be acquitted.
is an accurate statement of the law, it can hardly be conceded
that if a reasonable doubt exists as to whether defendant did
act in self-defense, he should be acquitted. The latter is simply
an inaccurate statement of the law.
Proposed Instruction at R.39. This instruction suffers from
the same defect as the Instruction at R.37. Appellant would
have the jury believe that if they" ... should have a reasonable
doubt ... that the defendant was lawfully endeavoring to defend himself ... and that he had had no intent ... " (emphasis
added) they must aquit him. The standard for acquittal is
reasonable doubt as to quilt not as to innocence.
Proposed Instruction at R.41. The appellant makes the
statement, "If you should have a reasonable doubt as to whether
defendant's theory of this case is true you should acquit him."
(Emphasis added.) Again we have a request for aquittal if
reasonable doubt exists as to defendant's innocence.
While it is admitted that many of these objections to the
proposed instructions are somewhat technical, when considered
in connection with the lack of supporting evidence it is not
difficult to appreciate the court's ruling as to such instructions.

CONCLUSION
The universal standard which governs the basis for and the
propriety of giving instructions to the jury in a criminal case
is the existence of substantial and competent evidence to support
such instructions. The record in this instance fails to reflect
the productions of either substantial or competent evidence sufficient to support the giving of appellant's proposed instructions. In addition, the instructions themselves are repleat with
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half-statements and misstatements of the law sufficient to
cause their rejection. It is submitted that the evidence presented
required no more than the giving of a general instruction as to
"just cause or excuse," and that the rejection of appellant's proposed instructions was in no way inappropriate. Eor these reasons, it is further submitted that the lower court's judgment
and conviction be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney General
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
CLARE A. JONES
Assistant Attorney General
2 3 6 State Capitol

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

